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Robert E. Hall, Stanford University and NBER
Boeri and Garibaldi's paper combines two of my main current research
interests: unemployment and the financing of social benefits, health in
particular. Although the United States is not the main focus of discus-
sions of the shadow economy, the issues raised in this interesting paper
will become highly relevant if the expected high levels of health spend-
ing in future decades are financed by taxes.
Edward Prescott (2004) has attracted a good deal of attention for his
claim that rising tax rates and corresponding benefits in Europe in com-
parison to the United States explain the decline in European work effort
relative to the United States. As in his earlier work, Prescott considers a
two-activity model, work and leisure (any activity out of the labor mar-
ket, including work at home). Unemployment is not an explicit feature
of the model or Prescott's analysis of variations in work effort across
countries.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) launched the other main active
branch of macroeconomic analysis of labor markets. Their model also
has two activities, work and unemployment. Variations in participation
or in hours of work are not part of their model, although they are not
hard to add. Boeri and Garibaldi build a four-activity model in the tra-
dition of Mortensen and Pissarides. Work and search occur in the legal
sector and the shadow sector. Workers make a decision about where to
search and thus where to work. This decision adds an important new
dimension to the analysis.
The model has two important wedges. First, the legal sector pays
taxes, which drive the usual wedge between the incentive to work
and the reward to work. Second, the shadow sector faces law-enforce-
ment monitoring. A key assumption of the model is that the authori-
ties will shut down a shadow firm if detected. If, on the other hand,
the authorities just start taxing shadow firms when they are found,Comment 165
all firms will launch in the shadow sector and then switch to the legal
sector if detected (possibly shutting down at that point). Shut-down is
inefficient within the economic theory of law enforcement, because it
dissipates the search capital in a shadow firm. Theory would favor a
monetary penalty in place of shut-down.
Another important assumption is that the value of search rises faster
with skill in the legal sector. This assumption implies a cutoff level of
skill, above which workers choose to search for jobs in the legal sector.
This assumption seems realistic and the implication in line with the
fact—firms employing high-wage workers are likely to be legitimate
and workers in the shadow sector earn relatively little.
Table 1 summarizes how the various influences affect employment
and unemployment in the two sectors.
The most important surprise is that raising unemployment benefits in
the legal sector raises employment in that sector—the effect of attract-
ing workers to search in the sector outweighs the shift toward more
unemployment in the sector.
The model explains the rise in European unemployment in terms of
higher taxes and higher unemployment benefits. Because it does not
consider the participation margin, it cannot explain the entire decline
in employment, and does not claim to.
The central issue for future policy in all countries, including emphati-
cally the United States, is the effect of the growth of taxes on the divi-
sion of activity between legal and shadow sectors. Hall and Jones (2005)
project that socially optimal health spending in the United States will
rise to half of GDP sometime late in the century. Though Europe trails
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the United States in the level of health spending, growth is inevitable
in Europe as well. Retirement benefits will also grow on both sides of
the Atlantic, though not nearly as much as health spending. It's close
to a certainty that health spending will be channeled through the gov-
ernment in Europe and highly likely that the government will have a
growing role in financing health spending in the United States.
It is hard to see how the future holds anything other than dramatic
increases in tax rates or government-mandated contributions to govern-
ment-supervised health plans. The shrinkage of the legal sector, which
will bear the burden of all of these taxes and contributions, and the
corresponding rise in the shadow sector, will be substantial. Boeri and
Garibaldi's analysis will be a central topic of public finance in coming
decades. European governments will need to start taking law enforce-
ment seriously—the paper suggests that benign neglect of the shadow
sector has been the primary principle in Europe. The U.S. federal gov-
ernment enforces wage taxes quite effectively at present. But marginal
rates in the U.S. counting income taxes and social-insurance contribu-
tions are only at about half the European level. As U.S. rates rise, the
law enforcement efforts needed to control the social sector and prevent
the complete collapse of the legal sector will be enormous.
The primary source of the potential collapse of the legal sector in all
advanced countries is that people in the shadow sector will receive ben-
efits even if they do not contribute to health and retirement programs.
No civilized country will exclude older people from these benefits.
Hence all of the effort needs to go into squeezing the shadow sector.
Tensions in this area will be huge.
Boeri and Garibaldi have advanced the study of the shadow sector in
an important way in this paper. I suspect that their work will be seen as
pioneering in an area of economic analysis that will become absolutely
central in social debates in coming decades.
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